Section 338--An Analysis and Proposals for Reform by Heinkel, R. Lawrence
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 8
12-1-1983
Section 338--An Analysis and Proposals for Reform
R. Lawrence Heinkel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
R. L. Heinkel, Section 338--An Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 158 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol59/iss1/8
Section 338 - An Analysis and Proposals for Reform
R. Lawrence Heinkel*
I. Introduction
An expanding corporation can acquire the assets of another cor-
poration in a multitude of ways. The most obvious method is to
purchase the assets directly. Alternatively, the acquiring corpora-
tion can purchase the shares of the target corporation and liquidate
it, obtaining the assets indirectly. Both methods can afford the ac-
quiring corporation and the target's stockholders substantially equal
economic benefits and tax treatment.
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982' (TEFRA), the direct purchase method gave the
acquiring corporation (P) a fair market value basis in the assets ac-
quired,2 while the target corporation (T) merely owned cash and in-
stallment obligations received on the sale of its assets to P. Unless T's
stockholders desired to preserve T as a non-operating corporation, T
could be liquidated. This sale and liquidation was generally accom-
plished in a manner which avoided the necessity of T recognizing
gain or loss on the sale of its assets.3 In the liquidation, the stockhold-
* Associate, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, Florida. B.S., 1979, University of
Florida; J.D., 1982, LL.M. (Taxation), 1983, University of Florida College of Law. Member,
Florida Bar.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and encouragment of his wife,
Kimberly Heinkel.
1 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS (96 Stat.) 324.
2 I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). Basis of property is generally its cost, adjusted elsewhere in the
Code to reflect depreciation and other items. I.R.C. § 1016 (West Supp. 1983). The purpose
of basis for an asset is to ensure that on its disposition no gain is recognized until the taxpayer
has had a return of his capital or investment in the asset. For example, if an asset is acquired
for its fair market value of $25 on January 1, 1980, and is sold two years later on January 1,
1982, for its then fair market value of $30, the gain realized is the excess of the amount
realized (S30) over the adjusted basis ($25 ignoring any adjustments), or $5. I.R.C. § 1001
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). The taxpayer is not taxed on the entire consideration received;
rather, the taxpayer first receives his investment ($25) tax-free and is taxed only on the excess.
Id.
3 Generally, T can avoid the recognition of gain or loss on the sale of its assets if such
sales are pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation, the sales are made within 12 months of
the adoption of such plan and T is completely liquidated within 12 months. I.R.C. § 337
(West Supp. 1983). No gain or loss is recognized by T when it distributes its assets in ex-
change for its own stock in complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983). This is
known as a § 337 liquidation.
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ers surrendered their shares in T for the cash and installment obliga-
tions T owned, and received favorable capital gain treatment on the
exchange.4 Despite the general nonrecognition rule on its sale of as-
sets, however, the target corporation was required to recognize cer-
tain "recapture" items.5 Depending on the nature of the assets sold,
the recapture "cost" was sometimes quite high.
If the indirect method was employed, P purchased shares of T
from T's stockholders for the fair market value of T's assets. Once P
owned T in a parent-subsidiary relationship, 6 P completely liqui-
dated T, surrendering its newly-acquired T stock and receiving all of
T's assets in exchange. P did not recognize any gain or loss on the
liquidation 7 and, if P purchased the target corporation's shares for
the sole purpose of indirectly acquiring its assets, P took T's assets
with a fair market value basis. 8 Thus, P acquired T's assets indirectly
4 Usually when stockholders receive a corporate distribution with respect to their shares,
the receipts must run the gauntlet of §§ 302 and 301 to determine if such amounts constitute
dividends and are taxable as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 301(c) (1) (1976). If the distribution is
received in a complete liquidation, the amounts are treated as full payment in exchange for
the stock surrendered and taxed as capital gain or loss. I.R.C. § 331 (West Supp. 1983).
5 A taxpayer can utilize certain provisions of the Code which are designed to compen-
sate him for wear and tear on assets, such as the various depreciation deductions. In certain
circumstances, Congress has granted taxpayers substantial tax breaks designed to stimulate
the economy and encourage investment in new plant and equipment. Examples of these
include accelerated depreciation (I.R.C. §§ 167(b) (1976), 168(b) (West Supp. 1983)) and the
investment tax credit (I.R.C. § 46(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983)). Since Congress has generously
granted these breaks which offset ordinary income when used, it would be too generous to
grant them outright. Therefore, these benefits are only "loaned" to the taxpayer and recalled
or "recaptured" when he disposes of the asset. The previously-taken extra depreciation and
the unearned investment tax credit are recaptured and brought into the taxpayer's gross in-
come as ordinary income. The circle is then complete. The tax benefits originally offset
ordinary income and are recaptured as ordinary income. The tax break is only temporary.
The notion of recapture is so strong that it overrides many otherwise nonrecognition
statutes. For example, recapture is required despite the general nonrecognition rule of a
§ 337 liquidation or § 336 liquidation. I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1), (b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981);
§ 1250(d), (i) (1976); 47(a)(1), (b) (1976). For purposes of this article, "recapture" also in-
cludes the assignment of income doctrine, Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th
Cir. 1962), and the tax benefit rule, Estate of David B. Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). See
Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Pariy in Tax Treatment Under Sections 337 and 334(b) (2) , 34 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 57, 68-72 (1976).
6 A parent-subsidiary relationship exists when the parent "controls" the subsidiary.
Control exists when the parent owns at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of all other classes of stock of the subsidiary.
I.R.C. § 368(c) (1976).
7 I.R.C. § 332(a) (1976) permitted P to receive T's assets in exchange for P's stock in T
without the recognition of gain or loss. To qualify for the preferential treatment of I.R.C.
§ 332(a), P had to have "control" continuously from the date of adoption of the plan of
liquidation until P actually received the assets.
8 The general rule is that assets received in complete liquidation of a subsidiary under
I.R.C. § 332(a) (1976) took the same basis in P's hands as the assets had in T's hands. An
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through liquidation but with the same tax treatment accorded a di-
rect purchase. P got the assets with a fair market value basis;9 T
recognized no gain or loss at the corporate level (other than recap-
ture cost),' 0 and any gain or loss T's stockholders recognized would
be of a capital nature."
The similarity of the tax treatment of direct and indirect asset
acquisitions was not coincidental. Courts perceived that a corpora-
tion might try to acquire assets of a target by some indirect method.12
Congress sought to equate, as nearly as possible in terms of gain rec-
ognition and asset basis calculation, the tax treatment accorded di-
rect and indirect asset acquisitions,' 3 for the legislators believed that
tax considerations should not be a factor in the decision of which
method to implement.
This article explains how the direct and indirect methods were
exploited to achieve results which Congress never intended. Internal
Revenue Code section 338, Congress' answer to these abuses, is ex-
plored in detail. Problems and gray areas remaining after the enact-
ment of section 338 are highlighted and discussed. Lastly, this article
exception to this carryover basis was originally provided when the purpose of P's stock acqui-
sition was to indirectly acquire T's assets. In that case, it was felt more equitable to treat the
transaction as if the assets were purchased directly so that the assets took a fair market value
(although cost) basis rather than carryover basis. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74
(1950), afdper curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951).
After the codification of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine in 1954, I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) pro-
vided fair market value basis to assets received in the complete liquidation of a subsidiary if
certain tests were met. First, the parent had to acquire the stock of the target by "purchase,"
defined as any acquisition other than (a) in a manner that P's basis in the stock was deter-
mined by reference to the basis such stock had in the hands of the transferee or determined by
I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); (b) in an exchange to which I.R.C. § 351 (West
Supp. 1983) applied; or (c) in other ways not germane here. I.R.C. § 334(b)(3) (West Supp.
1983). Second, the acquiring corporation had to "purchase" control within a 12-month pe-
riod beginning, generally, on the date of P's first "purchase" of T stock. I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1983). Third, the plan of liquidation had to have been adopted
within two years of the date P satisfied the control test. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1983). Fourth, the parent had to complete the liquidation within three years of the adoption
of the plan. I.R.C. § 332 (b)(3) (1976). This gave P a total of five years from the date control
was acquired to liquidate T and still receive fair market value or stepped-up basis.
9 See I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983) for the indirect method, I.R.C. § 1012 (1976)
for the direct method.
10 See I.R.C. § 336(a) (West Supp. 1983) for the indirect method, I.R.C. § 337(a) (West
Supp. 1983) for the direct method.
11 See I.R.C. § 1001 (a) (1976) for the indirect method, I.R.C. § 331(a)(1) (West Supp.
1983) for the direct method.
12 See, e.g., Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950).
13 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983) was enacted to effectuate principles derived from
Kimbell-Diamond. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954); BrrrKER & EUSTICE,




explains how the areas of abuse can be remedied in a more straight-
forward and comprehensive fashion, avoiding the extensive, complex
revisions of section 338.
II. Abuses of the Direct and Indirect Methods
A. Implicit Election
Over the years, certain practices involved in corporate acquisi-
tions and mergers have frustrated congressional intent underlying the
relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions. These devices have re-
sulted in substantial tax savings to the corporate participants, while
contributing nothing to economic recovery. The abuses centered
around the fact that section 334(b)(2), the statute granting a step-up
in the assets' bases to their fair market values,' 4 was implicitly an
elective provision.
Section 334(b)(2) required at least four steps to ensure its suc-
cessful application,15 and failure to meet any one of the tests, whether
unintentional or willful, rendered the section inapplicable.' 6 If sec-
tion 334(b)(2) could not be used, section 334(b)(1) was available.
This section allowed P to have the assets with the same bases they
had in the hands of the acquired corporation (that is, carryover ba-
ses). No recapture recognition was required if P took the assets with
carryover bases. '
7
14 See note 13 supra.
15 See note 8 supra.
16 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) was the exclusive manner to receive assets from a target with
a stepped-up basis, rather than a safe harbor. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. United States, 614 F.2d
990 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. American Potash and Chemical Corp. v. United States, 339 F.2d 194
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
Therefore, even if P purchased the stock of T with the intent of acquiring its assets
through liquidation, the intent was disregarded and the assets were received with a carryover
basis (and no recapture required) if (1) P deliberately waited longer than two years to adopt
a plan of liquidation, I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(A) (1976); (2) T took longer than three years to
distribute its assets to P in complete liquidation, I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(B)(i) (1976); (3) P took
longer than 12 months to "purchase" control, I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(B)(i) (1976); or (4) P trans-
ferred its T stock to a wholly-owned subsidiary (S) in a § 351 exchange and S liquidated T,
I.R.C. § 334(b)(3) (1976). See also Chrome Plate, 614 F.2d 990.
17 If a parent liquidated a subsidiary (I.R.C. § 332(a) (1976)) in a manner inconsistent
with the requirements of I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976), the general rule of I.R.C. § 334(b)(1)
(1976) controlled. The assets were received with a carryover basis and there would be no
depreciation or investment tax credit recapture. In any situation in which basis is carried
over in an I.R.C. § 332 (1976) liquidation, depreciation and investment tax credit recapture is
deferred. I.R.C. §§ 47(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983), 1245(b)(3) (1976), 1250(d)(3) (1976).
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B. Five- Year Period
The elective element of section 334(b)(2) was not in itself a ma-
jor problem; rather, abuses arose because P had too long (five years)
to decide whether to "elect" the section's benefits. 8 If section
334(b) (2) were chosen, the acquired assets took a basis stepped-up to
the basis of P's stock in T. The adjustment of P's date-of-liquidation
basis in T stock, to reflect T's operations from the time P acquired
the stock to the date of liquidation, was a complex process.' 9 In the
case of investment tax credit (ITC) recapture, the five-year period
actually reduced by twenty percent the recapture cost of the section
334(b)(2) "election" due to the annual reduction of the ITC recap-
ture.20 During the five-year period before the target was finally liqui-
dated and section 334(b)(2) was applied, P and T could file
consolidated returns, 2' enabling P to utilize any favorable tax attrib-
utes22 T possessed. This use of consolidated returns was allowed de-
spite the general prohibition against such use when the benefits of
18 P had 12 months in which to acquire control over T (I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(B)(i) (1976); if
P wished to obtain the benefits of I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), P had to liquidate T within five years
subsequent to acquiring control of T. But, if P did not liquidate T within the five-year pe-
riod, he would obtain the benefits of I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1976).
19 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4) (1982).
20 I.R.C. § 47(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1983). The investment tax credit is recaptured only
if the asset is "disposed of" earlier than the time period used to compute the amount of the
credit. If the taxpayer estimated the asset would last only three years, only 60% of its cost
would qualify for the credit. If instead, the taxpayer said it would last five years, 100% of its
cost would qualify for the credit. The recapture provision of I.R.C. § 47(a) (West Supp.
1983) was enacted to take back any credit to which the taxpayer was not ultimately entitled.
For example, if the taxpayer had three-year property but said it was five-year property to
qualify 100% of its cost for the credit, and then the taxpayer disposed of it after three years,
the taxpayer must pay back the unearned credit arising from the incorrect estimate of its
expected usefulness. The credit, then, is earned ratably over the property's estimated life at
the rate of 20% per year. After it is used five years, there is no longer a chance of investment
tax credit recapture with respect to that asset. Therefore, if P acquires control over T in the
first year and takes an investment tax credit with respect to an asset, it would be immediately
recaptured in full if T is liquidated and I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) is used. I.R.C. §§ 47(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1983), 381(a) (1976). If P waits the full five years to liquidate T, there would be
no recapture (I.R.C. § 47(a)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1983)) and the "cost" of the liquidation is
cheaper. The "cost" is reduced by 20% for each year P waits to liquidate T.
21 A consolidated return can be used by an "affiliated group" of corporations rather than
having each such corporation file separate returns. I.R.C. § 1502 (1976). Profits of one cor-
poration can be offset by losses of another. To qualify as an "affiliated group" of corpora-
tions, a common parent must own brother-sister corporations (I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (1976)) or,
as here, a parent must "control" a subsidiary (I.R.C. § 1504(a)(1) (1976)).
22 Tax attributes of a corporation include any net operating losses (NOL), earnings and
profits (E & P), capital loss carryover, and the method of accounting employed. I.R.C.
§ 381(c)(1)-(4) (1976). These can be favorable to P if T has an NOL or capital loss carryover
or a deficit in its E & P account. These attributes are usually succeeded to when assets are
acquired in an I.R.C. § 332 (1976) (parent-subsidiary) liquidation. I.R.C. § 381(a) (1976).
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section 334(b) (2) were sought.23 Thus, notwithstanding Congress' in-
tention to create mutually exclusive options for stepping-up or carry-
ing over the basis in liquidations, corporations devised a hybrid
system of tax treatment.
C. Selective Electivioy
In addition to the tax loopholes in the five-year election period,
abuses also arose from the parent's ability to "selectively elect" which
assets it wanted to fall within the ambit of section 334(b)(2). An ac-
quiring corporation achieved selectivity by directly purchasing those
of T's assets which, while highly-appreciated, had minor recapture
costs. The direct purchase of such assets gave the purchaser a cost
basis,2 4 with little or no recapture cost to the vendor. The purchasing
corporation then indirectly acquired the remaining assets of T with
significant recapture costs. The parent acquired these "expensive"
assets by purchasing the shares of T, avoiding the step-up rules of
section 334(b)(2) upon liquidation.2 5 By taking the recapture-heavy
assets with a carryover basis, P was able to avoid all recapture costs
attributable to the remaining assets. Additionally, the carryover ba-
sis rule of section 334(b)(1) enabled P to utilize favorable tax attrib-
utes of the acquired corporation.2 6 With this hybrid approach, then,
P was able to select which of T's assets it was willing to incur the
recapture cost on to achieve a stepped-up basis.
The combined use of a stock acquisition and partial liquidation
was another way to selectively elect which assets of a target were to
receive stepped-up bases. The U.S. Steel/Marathon Oil takeover
provides an example of this method. After U.S. Steel acquired
Marathon's stock, the latter distributed a valuable asset in partial
liquidation to U.S. Steel.27 The partial liquidation rules enabled
U.S. Steel to acquire the asset with a stepped-up basis, 28 but without
The attributes are used indirectly without a liquidation when a parent and subsidiary file
consolidated returns.
23 I.R.C. § 381(a) (1976) prohibited the use of T's tax attributes in an I.R.C. § 332 liqui-
dation if the assets take a stepped-up basis under I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976).
24 That is, an I.R.C. § 1012 (1976) cost basis.
25 If P preferred a carryover basis without recapture costs, the step-up basis rule of I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(2) (1976) was avoidable in a number of ways. See note 16 supra.
26 See notes 22-23 supra.
27 The asset was the Yates oilfield which had significant recapture costs largely attributa-
ble to intangible drilling costs and depreciation. U.S. Steel wanted the oilfield with a
stepped-up basis so it could take much larger deductions in the future. H.R. 6295, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 1928 (1982).
28 Prior to TEFRA, I.R.C. § 334(a) (1976) gave to property received in a distribution in
[Vol. 59:1581
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any gain recognition. 29 Although the only gain Marathon recognized
was recapture income, 30 U.S. Steel and Marathon were able to file a
consolidated return which permitted the depreciation recapture in-
come to be deferred. 3' Moreover, the ITC recapture rule was inappli-
cable32 and tax attributes relating to the other assets were available
to U.S. Steel due to the consolidated return.33 This scheme was re-
ported to have resulted in as much as $500 million in merger-related
tax benefits in the first year alone.
34
a partial liquidation a basis equal to its date-of-distribution value. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
31(b)(2)(i) (1972).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(b)(1) (1980).
30 Prior to TEFRA, I.R.C. § 336 (1976) generally granted nonrecognition treatment
(other than recapture) to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial liquidation.
I.R.C. § 311(d) (1976), which recognizes gain when appreciated property is used to redeem
stock, did not apply because a partial liquidation was not a redemption of the stock
surrendered.
31 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-13(d)(1) (1972), 1.1502-14(c)(1) (1972).
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3(0(2) (1972).
33 For example, Marathon continued to use its own method of accounting, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-17 (1966). Marathon's net operating losses were available to U.S. Steel, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-20 (1966); the consolidated group used consolidated capital gains or losses, Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502-22 (1966).
34 Tax Treatment of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, and of Certain Distributions of Appreciated
Property, andjob Training Credit Proposal Hearings on S 2687 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 62 (1982) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings]. An abuse was also available in the scenario utilized by Mobil Oil and Esmark.
Mobil wanted to acquire a subsidiary of Esmark (TransOcean Oil, Inc.). Id. Mobil acquired
enough shares of Esmark to equal the value of TransOcean. Esmark then distributed Trans-
Ocean to Mobil in a partial liquidation of itself. Although Mobil received fair market value
basis in TransOcean (I.R.C. § 334(a) (West Supp. 1983)), just as it would if it had directly
purchased TransOcean (I.R.C. § 1012 (West Supp. 1983)), Esmark recognized only recapture
income on the partial liquidation (I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983)) and not the full gain
realized, as it would have had Esmark sold TransOcean directly (I.R.C. § 1001 (West Supp.
1983)). The tax savings to Esmark amounted to a reported $100 million. Id. For a more
complete description of how partial liquidations were used to abuse the corporate acquisition
area, see Ward, The TEFRA Amendments to Subchapter C Corporate Distributions and Acquisitions, 8
J. CORP. L. 277, 284-86 nn.72-88 (1983).
The abuses prevalent in corporate acquisitions and mergers attributable to the use of
partial liquidations were corrected by re-defining a partial liquidation as a § 302 redemption.
Now a gain is recognized when appreciated assets are used in a partial liquidation, just as
with any other redemption, unless the distributee is a noncorporate stockholder who held at
least 10% of the distributor's stock for the preceding five years (or since the distributor's incep-
tion if in existence less than five years). I.R.C. §§ 311 (d)(2)(B), (e)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
Sale or exchange treatment is only available to noncorporate stockholders receiving assets in
partial liquidation. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (West Sup. 1983).
It is curious that Congress apparently intended I.R.C. § 338 to override the new partial
liquidation rules. In situations similar to the Mobil/Esmark scenario, several cases and I.R.S.
rulings have declared that, in essence, the target sold the asset directly to the acquiring corpo-
ration and the target then distributed the proceeds to its stockholders, which proceeds were
taxed as dividends unless I.R.C. § 302 applied. See, e.g., Idol v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 444
(1962), aft'd, 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963), Rev. Rul. 80-221, 1980-2 C.B. 107. But cf. Stan-
[1983]
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In response to these incredible tax savings, Congress attempted
to make the federal tax laws a more neutral factor in the decision of
how one corporation acquires the assets of another. In the words of
Senator Danforth, "what we want to get at is the United States
Steel/Marathon Oil and Mobil/Esmark type of a situation. '35 In a
relatively short period of time, a package was enacted which greatly
revised the partial liquidation and indirect asset acquisition rules. 36
III. Section 338
Congress attempted to remedy the situation with the enactment
of section 338 and the corresponding repeal of section 334(b)(2).
Briefly, section 338 stipulates that if an acquiring corporation
purchases control over a target, the parent must quickly elect
whether the target's assets will continue with the same bases they had
before the takeover, or whether the bases will be stepped-up to their
fair market values. Provisions were enacted to ensure consistent
treatment of all assets of the target and any target affiliates. In addi-
dard Linen Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1 (1959),acq., 1960-2 C.B. 7 (tax considera-
tions not the dominant reason for the form used). The Senate Report indicates that the
amendment to I.R.C. § 311 (d) (requiring gain recognition to the target corporation on assets
used in partial liquidation) are "not intended to affect the treatment under present law of
distributions that are in substance the purchase of assets." S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, 190 (1982). If Corporation A purchases 40% of corporation B and then receives an
appreciated asset (equal in value to the cost basis of the 40% of corporation B stock) in partial
liquidation, new I.R.C. § 311 (d) would recognize the entire gain realized because the partial
liquidation is a redemption. The same result is attained if the transaction is viewed as an
asset sale which, according to the Senate Report, is not within the ambit of I.R.C. § 311 (d)
because I.R.C. § 1001 would require full gain recognition. Assume instead P purchases at
least 80% ofT, does not elect I.R.C. § 338, and (within one year) receives an appreciated asset
in partial liquidation for 40% of T's stock. Since pre-TEFRA law (and the I.R.S.) viewed this
as a direct asset purchase, the Senate Report indicates I.R.C. § 311 (d) does not apply. How-
ever, the acquisition will trigger a deemed I.R.C. § 338 election because P did not expressly
elect I.R.C. § 338, yet did acquire an asset of T in a manner which triggers the consistency
provisions of I.R.C. § 338(e). In that case, the deemed I.R.C. § 337 sale (I.R.C. § 338(a))
would only require the recognition of recapture income and not the entire gain realized as
would have been required if the new I.R.C. § 311 (d) rules controlled. Therefore, if the value
of the asset or assets eventually to be received in partial liquidation is close to 80% of the
entire value of the target, substantial savings can be achieved by purchasing and redeeming
enough extra target stock to pull the transaction into I.R.C. § 338.
Although the TEFRA changes in the partial liquidation area constitute an important
weapon to counteract abuses in the corporate acquisition and merger areas, the partial liqui-
dation scheme will not be discussed further in this article.
35 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 160.
36 Rep. Stark, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House
Ways and Means Committee, introduced H.R. 6295 on May 6, 1982. This bill was referred
to as the Corporate Takeover Tax Act of 1982. Hearings were held on June 15, 1982 and the
final draft was prepared on August 17, 1982. In all, Congress had barely more than three
months to study the problem, work out solutions, and debug the Code.
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tion, although a liquidation is not required to receive stepped-up
treatment, section 338 provides that the parent cannot use any of the
target's tax attributes if the asset bases are stepped-up.
A. Section 337 Sale
When an acquiring corporation makes a "qualified stock
purchase" of a target,37 it can elect within seventy-five days to qual-
ify the whole transaction for stepped-up treatment under section
338.38 To further equate the tax treatment accorded direct and indi-
rect asset purchases, both methods now involve section 337.39 If the
benefits of section 338 are elected, T is treated as having sold all of its
assets on the date of "acquisition" pursuant to section 337,40 and a
"new" T is treated as having purchased the assets on the day after
the "acquisition.'"4 Generally, if P acquires all the stock of T, the
section 337 sale is deemed to have occurred at a price equal to the
basis of P's stock in T, properly adjusted for liabilities. 42 In essence,
the sales price is equal to the assets' fair market value.43
37 A qualified stock purchase is similar to the 80% control test required prior to TEFRA
for application of I.R.C. § 334(b)(2). In essence, the parent must acquire at least 80% of the
target by "purchase" within a 12-month period, even if the parent already owned some stock
in the target prior to the 12-month period in which an additional 80% is acquired. I.R.C.
§§ 338(d)(3), (h)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1983).
38 Unlike I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), I.R.C. § 338 requires an express election (I.R.C. § 3 3 8 (g)),
although P can be deemed to have made an election under certain circumstances. Se notes
57-63 infra nd accompanying text. An election is irrevocable. I.R.C. § 338(g)(3) (West
Supp. 1983). In addition, I.R.C. § 338 may be elected even if the intent of the stock
purchases was not to acquire the target's assets. If the acquiring corporation wishes to receive
a stepped-up basis but does not satisfy the requirements, there is no other method by which
the parent can receive a step-up. The parent cannot argue it "intended" to purchase the
stock solely to acquire the target's assets because the Senate Report makes it clear that I.R.C.
§ 338 was intended to replace any non-statutory treatment of a stock purchase as an asset
purchase under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. S. REP. No. 494, at 192.
39 With the direct method, P purchases the assets directly from T in an I.R.C. § 337
liquidation so there can be no non-recapture gain recognized. See note 3 supra.
40 I.R.C. § 338(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983). The acquisition date is the date on which P first
satisfies the 80% test of I.R.C. § 338(d)(3). I.R.C. § 338(h)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
41 I.R.C. § 338(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
42 I.R.C. § 338(b) (West Supp. 1983).
43 For example, ifT's assets are worth S100 but are subject to liabilities of $20, P would
not pay $100 for T's stock, but rather $80. Therefore, P's basis in T's stock is $80, but to
determine the I.R.C. § 337 sales price, the basis must be adjusted to reflect the $20 of liabili-
ties. T will be deemed to have received an amount realized of S100 and new T will have a
basis in the assets equal to $100. In situations where P does not acquire 100% control of T,
the Code provides a method for determining what P would have paid for T's shares if P had
in fact acquired complete control of T. This "grossed-up" basis is determined by multiplying
P's basis in T stock by 100% and dividing by the percentage of T stock P did acquire. Contin-
uing the same example, if P had only acquired 80% of T for $64, the grossed-up basis of P's
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The purpose of the deemed section 337 sale is to require that T
recognize the same recapture costs it would have recognized had T
sold all of its assets directly to P in the course of a section 337 liquida-
tion.44 In addition, the section 337 sale gives "new" T a section 1012
cost basis in the assets. P then owns stock in "new" T; all of "new"
T's assets have a fair market value basis. Because of the repeal of
section 334(b)(2), a subsequent liquidation of T 45 would fall within
the general rules of sections 332, 334(b) (1), and 336. That is, neither
P nor T would recognize gain or loss on the liquidation, and the
assets received from T would take carryover (though fair market
value) bases.
B. Prohibition Against Use of Consolidated Returis
Prior to the enactment of section 338, the acquiring corporation
could offset recapture income with any losses or credits it obtained
through the use of a consolidated return.46 This loophole was of ma-
jor concern to Congress. Section 338 grants the Commissioner broad
regulatory power to ensure that the purposes of the section are not
circumvented through the use of law or regulation, including the use
of consolidated returns.47 The Conference agreement clearly states
that the recapture income from the deemed section 337 sale is to be
reported on the return of the "old" target. The tax year of the "old"
target ends "on the date of acquisition and it does not become a
member of the affiliated group including the acquiring corporation
until the day following the date of acquisition. '48 - Only the "new"
target becomes a member of the acquiring corporation's affiliated
group.49 This amendment should further the goal of equating the
amount of recapture recognized in a purchase of stock/liquidation
and its functional equivalent, the direct asset purchase. For example,
the recapture income recognized by "old" T cannot be offset by any
stock in T would be $64 x (100% + 80%) = $80. When adjusted for liabilities, the deemed
purchase price would again be $100.
44 S. REP. No. 494, at 192-93.
45 A liquidation of T is not required if I.R.C. § 338 is elected. This ability to step-up
asset bases without forcing a liquidation is one of the major benefits of I.R.C. § 338. Liquida-
tions can be costly and time consuming. Many times it is impossible or impractical to obtain
assignments for leases, patents, or employment contracts. The opportunity to avoid liquida-
tion costs and problems without a concurrent loss of tax alternatives enhances the attractive-
ness of I.R.C. § 338.
46 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 74, 81 (statement of David G. Glickman, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
47 I.R.C. § 338(i) (West Supp. 1983).
48 S. REP. No. 494, at 193.
49 H. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 539 (1982).
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of P's losses or credits, nor can P utilize T's favorable tax attributes,
since P and T would not be affiliates and could not file a consoli-
dated return.
C. Explicit Election
Unlike the procedure of section 334(b)(2), section 338 requires
an express election within seventy-five days of the acquisition date.
50
This requirement will greatly benefit the tax law in the corporate
acquisition area. The complex basis adjustments formerly required
in section 334(b)(2) 51 are no longer necessary, and it is impossible for
P to reduce the ITC recapture "cost" of the acquisition by delaying
the "election.
'52
The requirement that the election be made within seventy-five
days is unwarranted, however. If an election is made, the section 337
sale is deemed to have occurred on the acquisition date, not on the
election date. 53 The sale price is also determined with reference to
the acquisition date. 54 Therefore, the parent gains nothing by delay-
ing an election beyond the time prescribed. 55 The election period
should be extended to allow more time for an informed decision.
D. Consistency Provisions
Another major weakness of section 334(b)(2), was a corpora-
tion's ability under that section to selectively elect which assets would
be stepped-up by combining direct and indirect asset purchases. Al-
ternatively, selectivity could also be accomplished by transferring
high recapture assets to a subsidiary of the target. P then purchased
the subsidiary directly from T, purchased T, and then liquidated
both target affiliates, using the basis rule of section 334(b)(2) for the
target with the "inexpensive" assets and section 334(b) (1) for the sub-
sidiary with the "expensive" assets. Another example of selectivity
involved the use of partial liquidation.
56
Many felt that an "all-or-nothing" approach would be prefera-
ble to the "selectivity" of section 334. Under the all-or-nothing ap-
50 I.R.C. § 3 3 8 (g) (West Supp. 1983).
51 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4), T.D. 6152, 1955
C.B. 61, 143-45.
52 See note 20 supra.
53 I.R.C. §§ 338(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1983).
54 I.R.C. § 338(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1983).
55 Letter from Lawrence Lokken (Editor-in-Chief, Tax Law Review) to R. Lawrence
Heinkel (March 11, 1983) (discussing the 75 day election period of § 338).
56 See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
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proach, if P wants to step-up one asset it must also step-up the bases
of all other assets acquired from T and incur the proper recapture
costs. 5 7 To effectuate this philosophy, Congress enacted the "consis-
tency provisions."'58 These provisions were designed to prevent selec-
tivity in asset acquisitions by forcing acquiring corporations to elect
section 338 if they make qualified stock purchases59 and acquire any
asset of the target corporation or one of its affiliates60 during the con-
sistency period.61 Consistency is also required if the acquiring com-
57 Although many groups and individuals have expressed their support for the "all-or-
nothing" approach (see, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 74, 85 (statement of David G.
Glickman, Treasury)), Professor Ginsburg has expressed a somewhat different view. In his
opinion, the serious problem was not that acquiring corporations could selectively step-up the
basis of one asset or assets and not others, but that "sophisticated corporate buyers" have
been able to avoid or defer paying the recapture "charge" on those assets which the corpora-
tion did choose to step-up. Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 125, 151 (statement of Martin D.
Ginsburg, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). As he put it, "present law
was operating in a manner inconsistent with underlying tax policy." Id.
58 I.R.C. §§ 338(e), () (West Supp. 1983).
59 I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (West Supp. 1983). A qualified stock purchase is a transaction or
series of transactions in which P acquires 80% control of T during a 12-month period. If P
acquires such control of T during a longer period of time, it will not be a qualified stock
purchase and P cannot elect I.R.C. § 338. However, P may still be deemed to have so elected
if the purpose of taking longer than 12 months to acquire control was part of a plan to avoid
I.R.C. § 338. I.R.C. § 338(e)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
60 A corporation is a target affiliate ofT if each was, at any time during so much of the
consistency period as ends on the date of acquisition, a member of an affiliated group (within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 1504(a), determined without regard to exceptions contained in I.R.C.
§ 1504(b)) having the same common parent. I.R.C. § 338(h)(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1983). This
is designed to curb the abuse of dispersing the different assets of T into subsidiaries. There-
fore, if P acquires only sub-i from T and does not elect I.R.C. § 338, P cannot acquire the
assets of sub-2 without being deemed to have elected I.R.C. § 338 with respect to sub-i.
I.R.C. § 338(e)(1) (West Supp. 1983). Without this provision, P could liquidate sub-1 using
I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (acquiring a carryover basis in the assets and avoiding recapture costs on
the assets of sub-I), and purchase desired assets directly from sub-2 to achieve low-cost,
stepped-up bases. Likewise, if P were to acquire sub-1, without electing I.R.C. § 338, and
within one year purchase assets directly from sub-i, P would be deemed to have made the
I.R.C. § 338 election as of the acquisition date. I.R.C. § 338(e)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
There are several types of asset acquisitions which would not trigger a deemed election.
The exceptions are for sales in the ordinary course of business (I.R.C. § 338(e)(2) (A)); assets
with a carryover basis to P (I.R.C. § 338(e) (2) (B)); pre-September 1, 1982 acquisitions (I.R.C.
§ 338(e) (2) (C)); assets located outside the United States (I.R.C. § 338(e) (2) (D)); and others to
be prescribed by the Service (I.R.C. § 338(e)(2)(E)).
61 The consistency period is so much of the 12-month acquisition period which has ex-
pired before the 80% test is met, plus one year before and one year after. I.R.C. § 338(h)(4)
(West Supp. 1983). For example, if P makes its first "purchase" of T stock on January 1,
1984, it has until December 31, 1984 to acquire 80% control for the acquisition to constitute a
qualified stock purchase. I.R.C. §§ 338(d)(3), (h)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1983). If, however, such
control is acquired on March 1, 1984, and P purchases the last 20% of T on September 1,
1984, the consistency period consists of January 1, 1983, to January 1, 1984, plus the acquisi-
tion period of January 1, 1984, to March 1, 1984, and also the one-year period from March 1,
1984, to March 1, 1985. Thus, the consistency period can be as short as two years (if control is
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pany purchases a corporation and subsequently acquires an affiliate
within the consistency period. Whether or not section 338 was
elected for the first acquisition, consistent treatment must be ac-
corded the second acquisition. 62 Congress believes that these consis-
tency requirements will eliminate many of the abuses involving
combinations of asset purchases with stock purchases.
63
IV. Problems with Section 338
Although the rationale behind the repeal of section 334(b)(2)
and enactment of section 338 is laudable, the legislation was aimed
at specific abuses of the corporate tax laws by large, multi-national
corporations.64 Highly publicized cases illustrated the extent of tax
loopholes concerning corporate acquisitions, and these loopholes be-
came the target of those committees charged with the responsibility
of increasing the tax revenues. 65 Legislation was quickly drafted;
66
weaknesses remain in the corporate acquisition area of the Internal
Revenue Code.
A. Explicit Election
Section 3 38(g) requires an election within seventy-five days of
the acquisition date. 67 Requiring a quick election does away with
both the old five-year period 68 and the complex basis adjustments
which were required under section 334(b)(2).69 However, before an
acquired in a single transaction) or as long as three years (if control is established on the last
day of the 12-month acquisition period). In addition, the Service is empowered to extend the
consistency period in either direction if an earlier or later purchase of an asset is part of a plan
to avoid I.R.C. § 338. I.R.C. § 338(h)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1983).
62 If P were to acquire sub-I and, during the consistency period, also make a qualified
stock purchase of sub-2, any decision to elect or not elect I.R.C. § 338 with respect to the first
sub is binding on the second. I.R.C. § 338() (West Supp. 1983).
63 The consistency requirements have been described as "a rational, logical and workable
solution to the problems involved in selectivity." Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 74, 85
(statement of David G. Glickman, Treasury).
64 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
65 The Joint Committee on Taxation recommended revisions in the corporate acquisi-
tion area as a way to plug certain loopholes and raise between $500 million and $1 billion
annually with even their limited revision suggestions. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
WITH THE STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES 103-07 (Joint Comm. Print,
June 15, 1982).
66 See note 36 supra.
67 The acquisition date is the first day on which the parent has made a qualified stock
purchase. I.R.C. § 338(h)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
68 See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
69 For a discussion of the complex basis adjustments required by I.R.C. § 334(b) (2) and
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election decision can be reached, P must determine the amount of
recapture on the section 337 sale, the proper basis allocation among
the assets, and whether the present value of the additional deprecia-
tion deductions attributable to the stepped-up basis exceeds the
"cost" of those deductions. 70 These calculations take time and sev-
enty-five days may be too brief, especially in light of the fact that an
election with respect to T would be binding on all T affiliates ac-
quired within the consistency period.7I Furthermore, because all cal-
culations are based on facts as they existed on the acquisition date, a
longer election period cannot benefit the parent corporation, except
insofar as it permits a more careful and informed decision. 72
Initially, it appears that failure to elect section 338 within sev-
enty-five days precludes its benefits forever. If P were to fail to elect
section 338, however, it could obtain the benefits of a deemed elec-
tion by purchasing an asset of T within the consistency period. 73
Nevertheless, the conference agreement provided the Internal
Revenue Service with authority to preclude a deemed election where
P makes a de minimis purchase of T's assets to avoid the short seventy-
five day time limit.
74
B. Consistency Provisions
Congress enacted consistency provisions75 designed to imple-
ment the all-or-nothing rule. Under Section 338, if P makes a quali-
fied stock purchase of T and elects not to step-up T's assets, T is
nonetheless deemed to have elected step-up treatment if any of T's
other assets are acquired 76 at any time during the consistency pe-
Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(i)-(iv) (1982), see Bonovitz, Current Liquidation Problems Under Section
334(b) (2) and Section 337 Distributions andReseraes, 30 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1095, 1135 (1972).
70 Battle, Section 338- Stock Purchases Treated as Asset Purchasesfor Tax Purposes, 60 TAxES
980, 982-83 (1982).
71 I.R.C. § 338(0(1) (West Supp. 1983). See also Senate Hearings,supra note 34, at 257, 264
(statement of Earl C. Brown, Arthur Andersen & Co.); id. at 267, 278 (statement of Herbert J.
Lerner, Ernst & Whinney).
72 See note 55 supra. On the other hand, a properly prepared corporation would not find
itself in a I.R.C. § 338 situation without much advanced planning and preparation. It is
arguable that a corporation which has done its homework would not need 75 days to decide
whether to make the election.
73 I.R.C. § 338(e)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
74 H. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 409, 540. In addition, failure to timely
elect I.R.C. § 338 cannot be cured by liquidating the target. Because old I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)
has been repealed, the assets would receive a carryover basis on the liquidation. I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(1) (1976).
75 See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
76 Some acquisitions do not trigger a deemed election. See note 60 supra.
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riod.77 For example, if P makes a direct asset purchase of one or
more of T's assets and makes a qualified stock purchase of T within
the next two years, P will be deemed to have elected section 338
whether or not it actually elects the section.7 8 An election is also
deemed if, after making a qualified stock purchase of T, P directly
purchases assets from T within one year.
79
Consistency is also required of target affiliates80 which a single
corporation acquires. If T has two or more subsidiaries and P
purchases two or more of them during any consistency period, an
election with respect to the first such purchase is binding on the other
purchases. 8' If no election was made with respect to the first such
purchase, P is precluded from electing for any subsequent
purchase.8
2
The consistency requirement for target affiliates has been at-
tacked as unnecessary. Critics maintain that the requirement is
based on the false assumption that without it potential targets could
rearrange their affairs by placing undesired, recapture-heavy assets in
a subsidiary.8 3 Others have urged that other provisions of the Code
are sufficient to attack the rearrangement,8 4 or that, since the crea-
tion of the subsidiary is part of an overall plan to defeat the intent of
section 338, the subsidiary would be ignored.8 5 Furthermore, section
338(f requires consistency of treatment for corporations of the same
"affiliated group. 81 6 Therefore, only if target corporations A and B
are owned by the same corporation must P consistently apply section
338. If corporations A and B are owned by an individual or partner-
77 I.R.C. § 338(e) (West Supp. 1983).
78 If P takes the full 12 months allowed to make a qualified stock purchase of T, the
consistency period would include both such 12-month period and the preceding one year (for
a two-year period) in which P can make a qualified stock purchase and have the earlier direct
purchase trigger the I.R.C. § 338 election. I.R.C. §§ 338(d)(3), (e)(l), (h)(4) (West Supp.
1983).
79 I.R.C. § 338(e)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
80 Two or more corporations are target affiliates if each was, at any time from the begin-
ning of the consistency period until a qualified stock purchase has been made, a member of
an affiliated group having the same common parent. I.R.C. § 338(h)(6) (West Supp. 1983).
81 I.R.C. § 338(0(1) (West Supp. 1983).
82 I.R.C. § 338(0(2) (West Supp. 1983).
83 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 167, 174 (statement of Herbert L. Camp, New York
State Bar Association Tax Section).
84 Id. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 269 (1976).
85 See, e.g., Telephone Answering Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), afd,
546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (no complete liquidation where
some assets remain in corporate solution after the transaction).
86 I.R.C. § 338(h)(5) (West Supp. 1983) defines "affiliated group" as that term is used in
I.R.C. § 1504(a) (1976).
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ship, or are unrelated corporations, P can acquire both without com-
plying with the consistency requirement.
One way to defeat this consistency requirement in the close cor-
poration setting would be for P's sole stockholder C to purchase sub-
B from T, and for P to purchase sub-A from T. P could then liqui-
date sub-A and receive a step-up in basis. The consistency require-
ment of section 338( would not apply with respect to C's ownership
of sub-A.8 7 Another method would entail C purchasing the stock of
sub-B with money borrowed from a bank. C could then form a hold-
ing company (D) and contribute both the shares in B and P (and
note that P, in the meantime, has acquired the stock of A) in return
for all the shares of D and D's assumption of the acquisition indebt-
edness. Sole stockholder C would not be taxed on D's assumption of
the acquisition indebtedness88 and, after P elected section 338 with
respect to A, corporations P, D and B could file consolidated re-
turns.89 There are undoubtedly other ways to avoid the consistency
requirements of section 338 which the Secretary may be able to cure
with additional regulations.90
C. Extensive Regulatoy Authority Granted
To help combat the abuses of section 334(b)(2) and ensure that
the remedies are not avoided through manipulative tactics, Congress
has granted the Service broad authority to issue regulations in ten
areas of possible abuse.9' It is most unusual for Congress to grant the
Service such extensive rule-making power; until regulations are
87 This avoidance scheme has also been proferred by Professor Ginsburg. See, Ginsburg,
TEFRA: Purchase and Sale of a Corporate Business, ALI/ABA Course Study on TEFRA, co-
sponsored by the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association, 379, 459 (1982).
[hereinafter cited as Course Stuy].
88 I.R.C. § 304(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1983).
89 Course Study, supra note 87, at 459.
90 Id. at 459-60. However, it is arguable that I.R.C. § 338 would reach even these trans-
actions even though P did not acquire the other assets directlyfiom T during the consistency
period, because the statute simply requires consistent treatment if the parent acquires assets of
the target. I.R.C. § 338(e)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
91 I.R.C. § 338(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983) (allocation of basis among assets); I.R.C.
§ 338(e)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1983) (exception from consistency rules for assets located without
the United States); I.R.C. § 338(e)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1983) (other exceptions from the consis-
tency rules); I.R.C. § 338(e)(3) (West Supp. 1983) (anti-avoidance rule for the consistency
rules); I.R.C. § 3 3 8 (g)(1) (West Supp. 1983) (timing of the election); I.R.C. § 338(g)(2 ) (West
Supp. 1983) (manner of electing); I.R.C. § 338(h)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1983) (extension of con-
sistency period if pursuant to a plan); I.R.C. § 338(h)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1983) (definition of
target affiliate as it pertains to foreign corporations); I.R.C. § 338(h)(7) (West Supp. 1983)
(acquisitions by purchasing corporation's affiliates); and I.R.C. § 338(i) (West Supp. 1983)
(general anti-avoidance).
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promulgated, section 338 provides no certainty to the tax planner.
This weakness in Congress' remedy could have been avoided by a
more thorough consideration of the problems leading to the enact-
ment of section 338.92
D. Other Problems
Since the Service has extensive rule-making authority, there are
many questions which the language of section 338 does not answer.
Until regulations are proposed, taxpayers must contend with such
uncertainties as: the effect a contingent selling price will have on
both asset basis and recapture income; the impact of a subsequent
price reduction in the shares of T which P acquired; and the effect of
additional stock purchases after a qualified stock purchase has been
made.9
3
V. Proposals in Lieu of Section 338
The corporate acquisition and merger area of the Code was in
great need of reform. Abuses cost the Treasury hundreds of millions
of dollars each year.94 Section 338 went a long way toward curing
the ills of section 334(b)(2); 95 however, some problems remain.
Section 338 is extremely long and complicated. 96 The following
proposals are designed to implement the goal of section 338 in a
manner that is as easy to understand as possible. To begin with, sec-
tion 338 should be repealed in its entirety. Its goal97 can be accom-
plished with simpler, less intrusive Code amendments. Section
334(b) (2) should be revitalized with several minor changes. The sim-
plicity of these proposals would be greatly appreciated by the tax
bar.
Note that Congress did not seek to affect the situation in which a
corporation liquidated a subsidiary it had acquired many years prior
to the liquidation. Rather, Congress sought to attack corporations
92 For a general discussion of the impact of the broad regulatory authority granted the
Service, see Battle, supra note 70, at 992-93; Silverman & Serling, An Anal yss of the TEFRA
Changes Affecting Corporate Distributions and Acquisitions, 57 J. TAx'N 274, 276 (1982).
93 These and other issues were raised by Professor Ginsburg in Course Study,supra note 87,
at 441-45.
94 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
95 See note 93 supra.
96 It has been argued that parts of I.R.C. § 338, in particular the consistency require-
ments, simply will not work in practice. See Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 125, 153 (state-
ment of Professor Ginsburg).
97 The goal is to equate, as nearly as possible, the tax results in an asset transaction and a
stock transaction. .d at 145.
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which purchased targets and liquidated them with the sole purpose
of acquiring their assets.98 There should be a difference, then, in the
tax treatment accorded a parent liquidating a recently-acquired sub-
sidiary versus one liquidating a subsidiary it formed or acquired at
some previous time. Preferential treatment should be given to all
corporations which "purchased" or formed the subsidiary at least
five years previous to the liquidation date. The following proposals99
refer only to corporations which have "purchased" or formed the
subsidiary more recently than within the last five years.
A. Explicit Election
The present seventy-five day election period for stepped-up basis
should be lengthened to about 150 days and accompanied by a
mandatory twelve-month (or shorter) liquidation period. The
shorter election and liquidation periods will offer the same benefits
they provide in section 338.100 The complex basis adjustments would
be unnecessary because of the shorter time between acquisition and
liquidation. Additionally, the consolidated return regulations should
be amended so that P and T are not entitled to file these returns if
section 334(b) (2) is elected. This amendment will prevent a meshing
of tax attributes during the interim between election and liquidation.
The recapture costs for the privilege of stepped-up basis would have
to be currently paid and not deferred or avoided entirely, as was pre-
viously possible.' ° '
B. Target-s Tax Attributes
Because T's tax attributes would not be available if P had
purchased T's assets directly, and since the purpose of the proposed
changes in section 334(b) (1) and (2) is to equate the tax treatment of
direct and indirect asset acquisitions (whether or not P takes some
assets with carryover bases), T's tax attributes should not be avail-
able regardless of which provision is used. Each provision calls for
basis calculation when the purpose of the stock acquisition and liqui-
dation is to acquire the assets indirectly. But under section 334(b) (1),
the tax attributes carry over to the recipient. With the proposed
amendments, however, section 334(b)(1) allows a different result if
the subsidiary has been held by the parent for at least five years. The
98 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
99 See § V(E) infa.
100 See notes 51 and 52 supra and accompanying text.
101 See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
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parent can only utilize the target's tax attributes if the subsidiary has
been held for five years or longer.
C. Constency with Target-s Assets
P's ability to combine asset and stock purchases was one of the
major concerns of section 334(b)(2). If Congress did not want P to
selectively recognize recapture income, instead desiring an all-or-
nothing approach, this objective could have been easily accom-
plished by requiring recapture even when T's assets take a carryover
basis. Section 334(b)(1), which normally gives assets a carryover ba-
sis without recapture recognition, should be amended to require the
same recapture recognition as is required when assets receive a step-
up under section 334(b) (2). The carryover basis should be increased
by the amount of recapture income which must be recognized. This
way, whether P wants a carryover basis 0 2 or fair market value ba-
sis103 in T's assets, recapture would have to be recognized and could
not be avoided by purchasing some assets directly and others
indirectly.
D. Consistency with Target Affliates
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to constructing a simplified alterna-
tive to section 338 is determining what kind of treatment to accord
the purchase of more than one corporation of the same affiliated
group (i.e., brother-sister corporations). The existence of two diamet-
rically opposed theories on the proper treatment of brother-sister cor-
porations further complicates the problem.
Congress adopted the first theory, denominated the all-or-noth-
ing approach, in section 338(f).10 4 This section requires consistent
treatment in the application of section 338 to target corporations ac-
quired from the same affiliated group during the consistency period.
Section 338 mandates an election for the second-acquired corpora-
tion if an election was made for the first-acquired corporation. 05
Correspondingly, if no election has been made for the first corpora-
tion, one cannot be made for the second corporation. 0 6
Thus far, the proposed revisions are not equipped to implement
the all-or-nothing approach. As it stands, P can acquire S-1 and S-2
102 I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
103 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
104 I.R.C. § 338(0 (West Supp. 1983).
105 I.R.C. § 338(0(1) (West Supp. 1983).
106 I.R.C. § 338(0(2) (West Supp. 1983).
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(brother corporations of the same affiliated group) and elect section
334(b)(2) with respect to one, without regard to whether an election
had been or will be made for the other. To appease the all-or-noth-
ing advocates, some provision might have to be added requiring a
consistent application to target affiliates. Such an amendment would
complicate the proposed statutory scheme beyond the degree desired,
however.
The following amendment would add paragraph (5) to pre-
TEFRA section 334(b):
(5) Consistency Required for all Stock Acquisitions from Same Afiliated
Group. (A) If an acquiring corporation satisfies the requirements
entitling it to an election under paragraph (2) of subsection (b)
above with respect to two or more target corporations of the same
affiliated group as another target corporation with respect to which
an election under this section has been made, and the requirements
are satisfied within one year of the date such election was made,
then elections will be deemed to have been made with respect to
such target corporations which were purchased during such one-
year period.
(B) If an acquiring corporation satisfies the requirements enti-
tling it to an election under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) above
with respect to two or more target corporations of the same affili-
ated group as another corporation for which the acquiring corpora-
tion was entitled to make an election under paragraph (2) of
subsection (b) but which election was not made, and the require-
ments are satisfied within one year of the date on which the election
option expired, then no election may be made with respect to such
target corporations which were purchased during such one-year
period.
But this amendment, while implementing the all-or-nothing
rule in the current section 338, suffers from the same infirmities as
section 338(f): it is based on an erroneous assumption about the tax
policy regarding brother-sister acquisitions. The all-or-nothing the-
ory is premised on the idea that if P wants a step-up in basis in some
of T's assets (whether that step-up be to the fair market value or
carryover basis, in the case of depreciated assets), P should be re-
quired to take a step-up in all assets of T that it acquires.
There is no sound policy justifying consistent treatment of two
subsidiaries, S-1 and S-2, if T has historically operated distinct busi-
nesses in subsidiary form. Without a doubt, if T owns a bakery com-
pany whose major assets consist of a building and equipment, P
should not be able to step-up the basis in the building without also
stepping-up the basis in the equipment, regardless of the recapture
costs. However, if T operates two distinct businesses, such as a
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bakery and a theme park, the justification for making P pay the "toll
charge" of recapture costs on both if it only wants an increased basis
in the theme park is much less compelling.10 7 And the rationale is
equally weak whether the separate businesses are operated as divi-
sions or through subsidiaries. The anti-selectivity or consistency pro-
visions of proposed section 334(b)(5) (and sections 338(e) and (f))
require consistency for all businesses of the target corporation, not
just the assets within one business.
The all-or-nothing approach should be rejected as inconsistent
with sound corporate tax policy.108 Selectivity was not a problem
because the assets of S-1 were stepped-up while those of S-2 were not;
rather, the gist of the problem was that "sophisticated corporate
buyers have been able to use the provisions of (pre-TEFRA) law to
defer or wholly avoid paying the toll charge tax on the assets that are
stepped-up." 0 9
The consistency requirement should also be rejected because it
will not work in practice. 1 0 The consistency provisions of section
338(f) and proposed section 334(b)(5) can be avoided with clever
planning."' For instance, in the close corporation setting, P can
purchase some of T's assets directly, acquiring a stepped-up basis in
them. P's sole stockholder can purchase T's shares which he can then
contribute to P in a section 351 transaction so that P will receive the
shares with a carryover (although fair market value) basis. P can
then acquire the remaining assets of T indirectly through a liquida-
tion, applying section 334(b) (1). Although this section requires a car-
ryover basis, that basis is equal to the assets' fair market value. A
combination of direct and indirect asset acquisitions would result, yet
section 338 (or proposed section 334(b)(5)) would not prevent the
abuse because P would not have acquired the stock from its stock-
holder by "purchase."'" 12
One might dismiss the above abuse as allowable since section
107 See Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 125, 148 (statement of Professor Ginsburg).
108 Id. at 150-5 1.
109 Id. at 151. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 167, 173 (statement of Herbert L.
Camp, New York State Bar Association Tax Section).
110 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 153.
11 For examples of how I.R.C. § 338(o and proposed I.R.C. § 334(b)(5) can be avoided,
see notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
112 The definition of "purchase" as provided in both I.R.C. § 334(b)(3) and I.R.C.
§ 338(h) (3) excludes an acquisition where the stock was acquired in an I.R.C. § 351 exchange
(I.R.C. §§ 334(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1983), 338(h)(3)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1983)), or if the basis
of the stock in the hands of the parent is determined in whole or in part by reference to the
basis such stock had in the hands of the person from whom it was acquired. I.R.C.
§ 334(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1983) and § 338(h)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1983).
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338 is not aimed at close corporations.' 3 Nevertheless, even corpo-
rate giants can avoid the clutches of the consistency requirements
through various techniques. For example, consistency can be
avoided through the use of leasing arrangements, reorganizations, re-
capitalizations and Subchapter S corporations.
1 4
Consistency provisions suffer from two drawbacks: they are eas-
ily avoided and are unsound from a policy standpoint. They should
be abolished. Without section 338(f) or proposed section 334(b)(5),
P can treat one bona fide target affiliate independently of the other.
E. Exception for Non-aggressors
These proposals apply to acquiring corporations which purchase
and liquidate targets to acquire assets. The amendments require
"toll charges" on all acquired assets, whether they were purchased
directly or indirectly and whether bases are carried-over or stepped-
up. The changes are also designed to prevent the deferral or outright
avoidance of recapture costs through the use of consolidated returns.
Just as tax attributes are not available to a direct purchaser of assets,
they would not be available if P liquidates a target within five years
of the "purchase."
These proposals do not apply to non-aggressor corporations
which hold subsidiaries as a means to operate a business."15 Thus
any liquidation of a subsidiary which has been controlled for at least
five years should be allowed without the necessity of recognizing re-
capture income. If the parent has controlled the subsidiary for five
years, section 334(b)(2) is unavailable. Therefore, only section
334(b) (1) would be available and the assets could be received with a
carryover basis but without recapture. recognition."*6 If the parent
does not liquidate its target but instead continues to own the target
in subsidiary form after the fifth anniversary of its purchase or for-
mation, the tax attributes of the subsidiary would be available to the
parent; both the parent and subsidiary could then begin to file con-
solidated returns.
VI. Conclusion
Although section 338 was a noble attempt to cure the ills of sec-
113 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
114 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 125, 154-57 (statement of Professor Ginsburg); Course
Study, supra note 87, at 379, 459-60, 462-70.
115 See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
116 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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tion 334(b)(2), its complexity and vulnerability compounded those
problems. The proposals of this article are comparatively easy to un-
derstand and implement, and better equipped to handle the
problems section 338 was intended to solve.
The proposals distinguish between subsidiaries held for more
than five years and those which are held for a shorter time period. If
held longer than five years, the parent and subsidiary can begin to
file consolidated returns and the parent can begin to avail itself of the
subsidiary's tax attributes. Instead, if the parent liquidates the sub-
sidiary, it can do so without recognizing recapture income. Addi-
tionally, section 334(b)(1) would give the parent a carryover basis in
the assets received, just as would be the case under present law.
The proposed rules are quite different for target subsidiaries
held for less than five years. Once the subsidiaries are "purchased,"
the parent has only 150 days to elect the benefits of section 334(b) (2).
If election is made, the target must be liquidated within twelve
months. At liquidation, the assets which the parent acquired receive
a step-up in basis and the target must pay the recapture costs. Con-
solidated returns would not be available to defer or avoid the recog-
nition of this recapture income.
If section 334(b) (2) is not elected, recapture income would still
be recognized if the parent later decides to liquidate the target and
the five-year period has not expired. Upon later liquidation, the car-
ryover basis of the received assets would be increased by the amount
of recognized recapture income attributable to each asset. Again,
even if section 334(b) (2) were not elected, consolidated returns would
not be available until five years have elapsed from the date on which
the election period has expired.
These proposals do not require consistent treatment of (1) bona
fide target affiliates which a corporation acquires or (2) target assets
used in distinct businesses of the target. As long as the acquired as-
sets are truly from separate and distinct businesses of the target, there
is no sound policy reason for requiring consistency, whether assets are
held by the target directly or in different subsidiaries.
These proposals are conceptually simpler and they provide
much more certainty than present section 338, with its grants of
broad regulatory authority to the Internal Revenue Service.
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